Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin is leaning on nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength after Russia’s apparent failure to ensure full security for the May 9 Victory Day parade without asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a ceasefire. Putin claimed on May 12 that Russian forces successfully tested the RS-28 Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), also referred to as the SS-X-29 or SS-X-30 in NATO classification.[1] Putin lauded the claimed range and payload of the Sarmat and highlighted Russia’s efforts to develop additional nuclear-capable weapons, including the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile — all of which Russia has either tested or fielded since the start of the full-scale invasion.[2] Putin claimed that Russia plans to deploy the first Sarmat missiles to combat duty with the 62nd Missile Division (33rd Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) in Krasnoyarsk Krai by the end of 2026. Putin and other Russian military officials stated in December 2021, June 2022, and then June 2023 that Russian forces would deploy Sarmats in the near future, all ahead of a likely failed Sarmat test launch in November 2024.[3] Putin’s rhetoric about the March 2026 Sarmat ICBM test launch mirrors his rhetoric about the initial tests of the Oreshnik IRBM, though Putin’s posturing with the Sarmat is intended to disguise his weakness made visible by the need to ask Ukraine to commit not to strike the May 9 Russian Victory Day parade.[4] Ukrainian deep rear strikes revealed Russia’s weakness and inability to reliably defend its deep-rear areas, including its capital, from these strikes, and Russia held a deeply scaled-down parade as a result.[5] Putin likely intends for his Sarmat test launch and rhetoric to disguise the fact that it was Ukraine, not Russia, whose actions guaranteed the safety of the Victory Day parade in Moscow.
Putin’s posturing with the Sarmat ICBMs also likely aims to distract from Russia’s worsening performance on the battlefield, particularly during the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Putin and senior Russian military officials have intensified their exaggerations of Russian battlefield successes throughout 2026, but the Russian rate of advance has declined monthly since October 2025 as Ukrainian forces escalated their mid-range strike campaign and imposed additional costs on Russian efforts to advance.[6] These costs have grown so great that Russian forces actually suffered a net loss of territory in the theater in April 2026 for the first time since Ukraine’s 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian recruitment rate dipped below its replacement rate for the first time in the war in January 2026.[7] Russian forces began their spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in mid-March 2026, but this effort has failed to yield operationally-significant advances.[8] Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured much of Kupyansk starting in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in winter and spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026.[9] Ukrainian forces have forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline — a choice that is embarrassing for Putin, whose theory of victory is dependent upon the facade that Russian forces are advancing simultaneously across the theater and are close to collapsing Ukrainian lines.[10] Not only are Ukrainian defensive lines holding, but Ukrainian forces have managed to contest the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline even as Russia continues to lose disproportionate amounts of manpower to achieve minimal gains.
Open-source reporting confirmed the first death of a Russian university student recruited into the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in combat, potentially in an assault unit. The BBC Russian Service reported on May 12 that it confirmed the death of Russian university student Valery Averin, who signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early January 2026 to serve in the Russian USF.[11] The BBC Russian Service reported that Averin completed drone operator training on March 24 and contacted his mother for the last time on April 2, and was killed in action by April 8, only two weeks after completing his training. Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that Russian forces “threw him [Averin] into an assault, right into the meat grinder” and that a Ukrainian “mortar strike” killed Averin. The local Kyakhta Raion Administration in the Republic of Buryatia claimed on April 24 that Averin died “near Luhansk,” likely referring to the frontline near or in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[12] Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that she heard of at least one other university recruit who died, but the BBC Russian Service could not independently verify any combat deaths of other university students recruited in the MoD’s USF recruitment drive. The BBC Russian Service suggested that Averin may have served in the Russian 147th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (likely of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), which is based near Averin’s university in the Republic of Buryatia.[13] The Russian MoD launched its USF recruitment campaign of Russian university students by January 2026 as part of its forced covert mobilization effort amid declining recruitment rates and rising casualty rates.[14] Russian milbloggers previously criticized the ineffectiveness of the recruitment campaign for the USF due to extensive reporting and worry that the Russian military command would transfer these students from their USF units to assault units.[15]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is leaning on nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength after Russia’s apparent failure to ensure full security for the May 9 Victory Day parade without asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a ceasefire.
- Putin’s posturing with the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) also likely aims to distract from Russia’s worsening performance on the battlefield, particularly during the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive.
- Open-source reporting confirmed the first death of a Russian university student recruited into the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in combat, potentially in an assault unit.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched 216 drones toward Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces may have continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense infrastructure on May 12. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows likely Ukrainian drone debris falling on a residential building in Orenburg, Orenburg Oblast.[16] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on May 12 that the Ukrainian drones were likely targeting the JSC Strela Production Association in Orenburg, which is one of the leading enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex producing supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and components for aircraft fighters.[17]
Satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) and additional information about recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and air defense assets in Russia. Satellite imagery taken on May 12 shows a damaged warehouse at the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, following a Ukrainian strike on May 8.[18] Geolocated imagery published on May 12 shows smoke rising near the Pipeline Operations and Dispatch Station in Perm, Perm Krai, after a reported Ukrainian strike on May 12.[19]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 12 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[20]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Chaikivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[22]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against frontline military assets in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) posted footage on May 12 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone unit in Novaya Tavolzhanka (northeast of Kharkiv City and approximately 9 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date before May 5.[23]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 12.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 12 but did not advance.[24]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on May 12.
Ukrainian forces continued long-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit near occupied Rozkvit (approximately 118 kilometers from the frontline).[25] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian temporary mechanics area near occupied Rovenky (approximately 125 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date before May 5.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces infiltrated the area. Geolocated footage published on May 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[27] Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Russian forces assaulting a Ukrainian position southeast of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28]
Russian forces continued targeting Ukrainian rear logistics and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) during the May 9 to May 11 truce. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on May 12 that Russian forces continued first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics in the rear near Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 12 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian GLOCs, including highways 15-20 kilometers from the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[30]
Order of Battle: A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command attached a company of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) in the Lyman direction.[31]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position east of Kostyantynivka, indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[32] Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in western Kostyantynivka in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and its outskirts and seized high-rise apartment buildings.[34]
Russian forces recently infiltrated the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a likely Russian-occupied building in eastern Molocharka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and a Russian servicemember south of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[35]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 12.
Russian forces continued offensive operations north, west, southwest, and northwest of Pokrovsk on May 12 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Pokrovsk.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 12 that both Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions increasingly prefer to use lighter and less conspicuous vehicles for transport and are reliant on ground robotic systems and heavy drones for conducting logistics within one kilometer of the frontline.[37]
Ukrainian forces continue frontline strikes against Russian military assets near Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Pokrovsk.[38]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Novopavlivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 11 and 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Bilyakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 12 but did not advance.[40]
Ukrainian forces continue mid- to long-range strikes against the Russian military in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 52 kilometers from the frontline), two Russian command and observation posts, and a control post near occupied Selydove (roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline).[41] Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian logistics depot in northern Boykivske (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline) before May 5.[42]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on May 12 but did not advance.[43] Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[44]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 12 but did not advance.[45]
Russian forces have been unable to make significant gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite reportedly redeploying at least three regiments to the area in early 2026. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst observed on May 11 that Russian forces redeployed the 387th and 1445th motorized rifle regiments (reportedly both attached to the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division) from an unspecified direction to reinforce the other elements of the division near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) in early 2026, and the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) to western Zaporizhia Oblast from the Kherson direction around March and April 2026.[46] ISW last observed elements of the 387th Motorized Rifle Regiment fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast alongside VDV units in late October 2023, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the regiment was operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 2024 as part of a newly-formed 44th VDV Division.[47] ISW last observed elements of the 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Kherson direction as of November 2024.[48] ISW last observed reports that the 299th VDV Regiment was operating in the Kherson direction as of April 10, 2026.[49] Russian forces have failed to reverse Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite the commitment of these additional units.[50]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on May 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot in occupied Novopoltavka (roughly 37 kilometers from the frontline) and a troop concentration in occupied Okhrimivka (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline).[51]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 12.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 11 to May 12, killing at least 4 civilians and injuring at least 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 216 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[52] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 192 drones, that 25 drones struck 10 locations, and that downed debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy and railway infrastructure; residential buildings; Dnipropetrovsk; targets in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts; and a kindergarten in Kyiv City — killing at least 4 civilians and injuring at least 23.[53]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79724
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/
[3] https://t.me/astrapress/112358; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/12/putinu-dolozhili-ob-uspeshnyh-ispytaniyah-raketnogo-kompleksa-sarmat-do-kontsa-goda-ego-planiruyut-postavit-na-boevoe-dezhurstvo; https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20211217031-kgCLl.html; https://t.me/navideovidno/46718; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/63a2f8c29a7947064a8e65a9; https://istories dot media/news/2026/05/12/putin-snova-poobeshchal-postavit-sarmati-na-boevoe-dezhurstvo/; https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/24/europe/russia-sarmat-missile-test-failure-intl
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putins-theory-of-victory-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/seizing-the-initiative-against-russia-putting-the-united-states-in-control-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[11] https://www.bbc dot com/russian/articles/cx21kpjwym7o
[12] https://archive dot ph/G1cun
[13] https://vk dot com/wall-2178627_531389; https://www.baikal-daily dot ru/news/16/428689/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/;
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/
[16] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7550; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20446; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20443 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/172161 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/57782 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/375477 ; https://t.me/idelrealii/45097;
[17] https://t.me/astrapress/112336; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/nad-rosijskym-mistom-orenburg-pomityly-udarnyj-dron/
[18] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12989
[19] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12991
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38560; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526; https://t.me/wargonzo/34112
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38560; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/210314; https://t.me/zovpobedy/17966
[23] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2822
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20643 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526; https://t.me/gvZapad/18534
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38561
[26] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2822
[27] https://t.me/OMSBr_123/2028; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2053873080682868921/history
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11903; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/419
[29] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bkJCznLSEXU&t=1290s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/12/yak-lizly-tak-i-lizut-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-golovnym-zavdannyam-ye-zahyst-logistyky/
[30] https://t.me/rybar/80225
[31] https://t.me/gvZapad/18538
[32] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054188673936032031; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/5041
[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054170168415175040; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33016;
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43005
[35] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054192472947847530; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11909; https://t.me/official24ombr/2236; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2053860882300416410;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2053860889799897150; https://t.me/BBpS_28/1132
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38560 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34112 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43000
[37] https://t.me/sashakots/61667
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38561
[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11900; https://t.me/FilimonovGonor/575; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2054192785876509084; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/210290
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526;
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38561
[42] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35616; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2822
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38560 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526
[44] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2054100976252985417; https://t. me/voin_dv/19512
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38560; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38538; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38526; https://t.me/epoddubny/27440; https://t.me/wargonzo/34112
[46] https://x.com/WarUnitObserver/status/2053950200863916382
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-by-the-ukraine-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-6/
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024/
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38561
[52] https://t.me/kpszsu/61648
[53] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18958; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29015; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/63597; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/15370; https://t.me/synegubov/21772 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/56483; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/56485; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/12893; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10053; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/60434
